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Genetic analysis identifies potential transmission of low 
pathogenic avian influenza viruses between poultry farms








































that	 between-farm	 transmission	 occurred	 in	 seven	 of	 nine	 virologically	 analysed	
cases.	Based	on	these	findings,	 it	 is	 likely	that	between-farm	transmission	contrib-
utes	considerably	to	the	incidence	of	LPAI	virus	infections	in	poultry.








ruses	 carry	 two	 surface	 glycoproteins,	 haemagglutinin	 (HA)	 and	
neuraminidase	(NA),	which	are	used	for	virus	classification	(Webster,	









commercial	poultry	because	of	 their	potential	 to	evolve	 into	highly	



















spread	 between	 farms.	 Recent	 HPAI	 outbreaks	 have	 demonstrated	
that	 AI	 viruses	 can	 spread	 rapidly	 between	 farms	 (Dargatz,	 Beam,	
Wainwright,	 &	 McCluskey,	 2016;	 Guinat	 et	 al.,	 2018;	 Stegeman	 et	









rent	outbreaks	of	H9N2	 infections	 in	Asia	and	the	Middle	East	 (late	
1990s–present)	(Capua	&	Alexander,	2004;	Gu,	Xu,	Wang,	&	Liu,	2017).





et	 al.,	 2005;	 Velkers,	 Blokhuis,	 Veldhuis	 Kroeze,	 &	 Burt,	 2017;	







or	 separate	 introductions	 from	 the	 same	 environmental	 source	
(Boender	 et	 al.,	 2007;	Mulatti,	 Bos,	 Busani,	Nielen,	&	Marangon,	
2010).	However,	the	exact	route	of	introduction	into	poultry	often	
remains	 untraced	 and	 mechanisms	 underlying	 between-farm	
spread	of	AI	viruses	are	not	clearly	understood.













This	 study	 combines	 routinely	 collected	 surveillance	 data	
with	genetic	analysis	to	assess	the	contribution	of	between-farm	
transmission	 to	 the	 overall	 incidence	 of	 LPAI	 virus	 infections	 in	
poultry.	We	 analysed	 220	 serological	 and	 virological	 detections	
of	 LPAI	 virus	 infections	 that	 occurred	 in	 commercial	 poultry	 in	
the	 Netherlands	 between	 2006	 and	 2016,	 to	 identify	 potential	
between-farm	transmission	cases.	Spatial	analysis	was	performed	
for	 each	 potential	 between-farm	 transmission	 case	 separately	
to	 determine	 whether	 infected	 farms	 clustered	 geographically.	
Subsequently,	 whole	 genome	 sequence	 analysis	 was	 performed	
to	 determine	 the	 genetic	 relationship	 between	 viruses	 isolated	
from	potential	 between-farm	 transmission	 cases.	Genetic	 analy-
sis	was	 combined	with	 information	 regarding	 time,	 distance	 and	
poultry	type	to	identify	epidemiological	variables	associated	with	
between-farm	 transmission.	 Better	 understanding	 of	 LPAI	 virus	
transmission	routes	into	poultry	and	between	farms	is	important	
to	control	virus	spread	in	an	early	stage.
2  | MATERIAL S AND METHODS
2.1 | Ethical statement
Poultry	 blood	 and	 swab	 samples	 were	 collected	 as	 part	 of	 the	




tions.	 Sampling	 of	 poultry	 was	 carried	 out	 in	 accordance	 with	
Council	Directive	2005/94/EC	of	20	December	2005	on	European	
Union	measures	 for	 the	 control	 of	 AI	 (EU,	 2005)	 and	 regulation	
TRCJZ/2005/1411	 of	 7	 June	 2005	 concerning	 the	 prevention,	
control	 and	 monitoring	 of	 infectious	 animal	 diseases,	 zoonoses	
and	transmissible	spongiform	encephalopathies	(TSEs).	This	study	




Samples	 were	 collected	 between	 January	 2006	 and	 September	
2016.	 The	 study	 population	 involved	 2,379	 commercial	 poul-
try	 farms	 in	 the	Netherlands,	 consisting	of	 farms	holding	broiler	






commercial	poultry	 farms	 in	 the	Netherlands	once	a	year,	except	
outdoor	layer	chicken	and	turkey	farms,	which	were	sampled	four	
times	a	year	and	each	production	cycle	respectively.	Screening	of	
serum	 for	 the	 presence	 of	 influenza-specific	 antibodies	was	 per-
formed	by	the	GD	Animal	Health	Service	using	the	FlockChek	AI	
MultiS-Screen	 Ab	 Test	 Kit	 (IDEXX).	 Samples	 identified	 as	 posi-
tive	 for	 influenza-specific	 antibodies	 were	 subsequently	 tested	
by	 the	 national	 reference	 laboratory	 Wageningen	 Bioveterinary	
Research	(WBVR)	in	a	H5	and	H7	subtype-specific	haemagglutina-
tion	inhibition	(HI)	test	according	to	the	OIE	Manual	of	Standards	














WBVR	using	 the	 real-time	 reverse	 transcription	 polymerase	 chain	
reaction	method	targeting	the	matrix	gene	(M-PCR)	(Fouchier	et	al.,	
2000).	 Influenza	 virus-positive	 samples	 were	 subsequently	 tested	
in	 a	H5	 and	H7	 subtype-specific	PCR	 (Slomka	et	 al.,	 2007,	 2009).	
The	sequence	of	the	HA	proteolytic	cleavage	site	was	analysed	to	










generation	 sequencing	 (NGS),	 as	 described	previously	 (Beerens	 et	
al.,	 2017).	 In	 short,	 RNA	was	 purified	 from	 swab	 specimen	 or	 al-
lantoic	 fluid	 using	 the	High	 Pure	Viral	 RNA	Kit	 (Roche),	 amplified	
using	 universal	 primers	 and	 sequenced	with	 a	minimum	 sequence	
coverage	of	1,000	 reads	using	 the	paired-end	200	 Illumina	MiSeq	
platform.	Consensus	 sequences	were	 generated	 in	CLC	Genomics	










more	poultry	 farms	 testing	positive	 for	LPAI	virus	 infection	of	 the	
same	HA/NA	subtype	within	a	time	interval	between	two	consecu-
tive	detections	of	maximum	6	months.	To	 identify	 statistically	 sig-
nificant	 spatial	 clusters	 of	 infected	 farms,	 spatial	 cluster	 analysis	
was	 performed	 using	 the	 free	 software	 program	 SaTScan	 version	
9.6	 (http://www.satscan.org)	 (Kulldorff,	 1997)	 for	 each	 potential	
between-farm	 transmission	 case	 separately.	 Input	 data	 were	 rep-




than	would	 be	 expected	 by	 chance	 (p	<	0.05).	 Geographical	maps	
were	generated	using	the	statistical	software	package	R	version	3.4.0	









3.1 | Identification of potential between‐farm 
transmission cases
To	identify	potential	between-farm	transmission	cases,	we	analysed	
220	 serological	 and	 virological	 detections	 of	 LPAI	 virus	 infections	
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that	 occurred	 in	 commercial	 poultry	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 between	
2006	and	2016,	which	 included	162	seropositive	and	58	viroposi-




















3.2 | Genetic analysis of potential between‐farm 
transmitted viruses
Next-generation	sequencing	 was	 performed	 to	 analyse	 poten-
tial	 transmissions	 between	 farms	 genetically.	 The	 LPAI	 virus	 se-
quences	were	obtained	from	21	viropositive	farms	involved	in	nine	
potential	 between-farm	 transmission	 cases	 (Table	 S1).	 In	 five	 of	




After	 the	 whole	 genome	 sequences	 were	 determined,	 ge-
netic	analysis	was	performed	by	aligning	 the	nucleotide	consen-
sus	 sequences	 of	 potentially	 between-farm	 transmitted	 viruses	
for	 each	 gene	 segment	 separately	 (Figure	 2b).	 Viruses	 isolated	
from	 potential	 cases	 H1N5-2007,	 H10N7-2009,	 H6N1-2010,	
H10N9-2012,	H5N3-2013	and	H6N2-2014	shared	nucleotide	se-
quence	identities	of	99.70%–100.00%	in	all	eight	gene	segments.	
Additionally,	 viruses	 isolated	 from	 potential	 cases	 H1N5-2007	
and	 H10N7-2009	 both	 contained	 a	 deletion	 in	 the	 stalk	 region	
of	the	NA	protein	of	18	and	21	amino	acids	respectively.	Viruses	
H7N7-2011-2	 and	 H7N7-2011-3	 also	 showed	 less	 than	 0.3%	
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from	 potential	 cases	 H8N4-2011	 and	 H7N7-2013.	 H8N4-2011	
viruses	showed	high	sequence	identities	 in	NP	and	MP	(99.60%),	
but	 relatively	 low	 sequence	 identities	 in	 PB2,	 PB1,	 PA,	 HA	 and	
NA	 (93.81%–98.35%).	 For	 NS,	 only	 53.84%	 sequence	 identity	





identities	 of	 99.70%–100.00%	 in	 all	 gene	 segments,	 in	 seven	 of	
























potential	 case	 H6N2-2014,	 all	 nucleotide	 variants	 detected	 in	 the	
viral	 subpopulation	 of	 H6N2-2014-1	 were	 fixed	 in	 the	 consensus	



















(range	 1–36	days),	which	was	 lower	 but	 not	 significantly	 different	
from	that	of	the	genetically	distinct	viruses	(median	time	interval	of	
43	days;	range	6–62	days)	(p	=	0.06).	The	median	distance	between	
the	 collection	 locations	 of	 genetically	 closely	 related	 viruses	 was	
6.3	km	 (range	 0.6–68.9	km),	 which	 was	 significantly	 shorter	 com-
pared	to	that	of	the	genetically	distinct	viruses	(median	distance	of	
69.0	km;	range	41.3–72.3	km)	(p	<	0.05).	Genetically	closely	related	
viruses	 isolated	 from	 potential	 cases	 H1N5-2007,	 H10N7-2009,	
H6N1-2010,	 H7N7-2011	 and	 H10N9-2012	 were	 collected	 within	
spatial	 clusters	with	distances	between	 farms	 ranging	 from	0.6	 to	
6.9	km,	suggesting	 local	spread	between	farms	or	 independent	 in-
fections	by	 the	same	 local	 source.	Additionally,	 seropositive	 farms	
were	 detected	 within	 the	 same	 spatial	 cluster	 in	 potential	 cases	




cases	 H5N3-2013	 and	 H6N2-2014	 were	 located	 at,	 respectively,	
21.3	and	18.5–68.9	km	distance,	indicating	long-distance	spread.
Finally,	poultry	 types	 involved	 in	potential	between-farm	trans-
mission	 cases	were	 examined.	 All	 genetically	 distinct	 viruses	were	
isolated	from	outdoor	chicken	layer	farms.	The	16	genetically	closely	
related	viruses	were	isolated	from	six	chicken	layer	farms	with	out-
door	 facilities	 (38%)	 and	 10	 farms	with	 an	 indoor	 housing	 system,	
including	 six	 turkey	 farms	 (38%),	 two	 duck	 farms	 (13%)	 and	 two	
chicken	 layer	 farms	 (13%).	 Potential	 spread	 within	 a	 poultry	 type	
was	 observed	 between	 farms	 infected	 with	 viruses	 H1N5-2007-1	
and	H1N5-2007-2	(turkeys),	H6N1-2010-1	and	H6N1-2010-2	(indoor	
chickens),	H10N9-2012-2	and	H10N9-2012-3	(turkeys),	H5N3-2013-1	




holding	 a	 different	 poultry	 type	 (Table	 S3).	 In	 contrast,	 potential	
spread	between	farms	holding	different	poultry	types	was	observed	
in	 farms	 infected	 with	 viruses	 H10N7-2009-1	 and	 H10N7-2009-2	
(turkeys–outdoor	 chickens),	 H7N7-2011-1	 and	 H7N7-2011-2	 (out-
door	chickens–turkeys),	H10N9-2012-1	and	 the	 two	other	 infected	
farms	 (outdoor	 chickens–turkeys)	 and	 H6N2-2014-2	 and	 the	 two	
other	 infected	 farms	 (outdoor	chickens–domestic	ducks).	The	com-
bined	results	suggest	that	between-farm	transmission	of	LPAI	viruses	






TA B L E  1  Minority	variant	analysis	of	genetically	closely	related	low	pathogenic	avian	influenza	(LPAI)	viruses	isolated	from	potential	
between-farm	transmission	cases
Potential case Virus alignment
No. of nucleotide 
differences
No. of shared minority 
variants
No. of minority variants at 
consensus‐level variant sites
H1N5-2007 1–2 4 0 4
H10N7-2009 1–2 10 1 2
H6N1-2010 1–2 14 0 4
H7N7-2011 2–3 12 0 12
H10N9-2012 1–2 25 0 4
1–3 25 0 12
2–3 8 1 6
H5N3-2013 1–2 24 0 2
H6N2-2014 1–2 9 0 4
1–3 11 0 4
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of	 LPAI	 virus	 infections	 to	 identify	 potential	 between-farm	 trans-





showed	 that	 in	 10	 of	 these	 cases	 farms	 clustered	 geographically.	
The	number	of	farms	involved	in	each	case	was	relatively	small	(2–7	






be	due	 to	 recurrent	 virus	 introductions	 from	 the	wild	bird	popula-
tion.	However,	no	related	wild	bird	viruses	were	detected	in	the	same	
time	 frame	 between	2006	 and	 2011	 (Verhagen	 et	 al.,	 2017),	 or	 in	
recent	 years.	Also,	 none	of	 the	 viruses	were	 associated	with	HPAI	
outbreaks	that	were	reported	in	the	Netherlands	in	2014,	2016	and	
2017	(Beerens	et	al.,	2017,	2018;	Bouwstra	et	al.,	2015).
Genetic	 analysis	 was	 performed	 using	 the	 whole	 genome	 se-
quences	 of	 21	 LPAI	 viruses	 isolated	 from	 nine	 potential	 cases.	













in	 seven	 of	 nine	 virologically	 analysed	 cases	 involving	 16	 poultry	
farms.	The	close	genetic	relationship	between	the	viruses	suggests	
between-farm	transmission	or	separate	introductions	from	the	same	
environmental	 source.	Neuraminidase	 stalk	 deletions	were	 identi-
fied	 in	potential	cases	H1N5-2007	and	H10N7-2009.	A	deletion	in	
the	NA	 stalk	 region	 is	 considered	 a	marker	 of	 virus	 adaptation	 to	
chickens,	turkeys	and	other	gallinaceous	hosts	(Li	&	Cardona,	2010;	
Li,	Zu	Dohna,	Cardona,	Miller,	&	Carpenter,	2011),	and	is	rarely	de-
tected	 in	wild	birds	without	a	 link	 to	poultry.	Neuraminidase	stalk	
deletions	cause	a	change	in	tropism	from	the	intestine	to	the	respi-
ratory	tract	in	chickens	(Hoffmann	et	al.,	2012;	Sorrell,	Song,	Pena,	





Moreover,	 shared	 minority	 variants	 or	 minority	 variants	 at	
consensus-level	 variant	 sites	were	 identified	 in	 all	 seven	 potential	









In	 contrast,	 a	 relatively	 low	 number	 of	minority	 variants	 together	
with	a	relatively	high	number	of	nucleotide	differences	in	potential	




Surprisingly,	 minority	 variant	 analysis	 indicated	 that	 virus	
H10N9-2012-1	 was	 genetically	 more	 closely	 related	 to	 virus	
H10N9-2012-3	than	to	virus	H10N9-2012-2,	despite	the	larger	time	
interval	 between	 the	 collection	 dates.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 viruses	
H10N9-2012-1	 and	 H10N9-2012-2	 shared	 two	 fixed	 nucleotide	
variants	 that	were	not	present	 in	virus	H10N9-2012-3.	We	 there-
fore	hypothesize	that	the	virus	was	transmitted	from	H10N9-2012-1	
to	 H10N9-2012-2	 and	 H10N9-2012-3	 via	 another	 (seropositive)	
farm	within	 the	 same	 spatial	 cluster.	 This	hypothesis	 is	 supported	
by	 the	 relatively	 high	 number	 of	 nucleotide	 differences	 between	
virus	 H10N9-2012-1	 and	 the	 other	 two	 isolates.	Minority	 variant	
analysis	also	revealed	that	viruses	H6N2-2014-1	and	H6N2-2014-2	
shared	 four	 fixed	 nucleotide	 variants	 that	 were	 not	 present	 in	






Contact	 tracing	 to	 study	 the	 intensity	of	movements	between	
farms	could	reveal	potential	modes	of	transmission,	but	is	generally	
not	 performed	 for	 non-notifiable	 LPAI	 viruses.	Here,	we	 analysed	
other	epidemiological	links	between	farms,	such	as	the	time	interval	
between	virus	detections,	the	distance	between	farms	and	poultry	
types,	 to	 identify	variables	 that	may	be	associated	with	between-
farm	transmission.
Temporal	 analysis	 demonstrated	 that	 genetically	 closely	 re-
lated	viruses	were	detected	within	a	median	time	interval	of	8	days	
(range	1–36	days).	Previous	studies	have	shown	that	viral	shedding	
can	 already	 be	 observed	 from	 one	 day	 after	 experimental	 infec-
tion	 in	 chickens	 (Swayne	 &	 Beck,	 2005;	 van	 der	 Goot,	 de	 Jong,	
Koch,	&	Van	Boven,	2003).	The	mean	infectious	period	of	individ-
ual	 LPAI	 virus-infected	 birds	 was	 estimated	 to	 range	 between	 4	
and	 8	days	 (Comin,	 Klinkenberg,	Marangon,	 Toffan,	 &	 Stegeman,	
2011;	 Gonzales,	 van	 der	 Goot,	 Stegeman,	 Elbers,	 &	 Koch,	 2011;	
van	der	Goot	et	al.,	2003).	However,	the	duration	of	the	infectious	
period	 of	 an	 infected	 flock	 can	 take	much	 longer,	 depending	 on	
within-flock	 transmission	 dynamics	 influenced	 by	 the	 virus	 and	
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flock	characteristics,	such	as	poultry	type,	age	of	production	and	






subtypes	other	 than	H5	and	H7.	The	 time	 intervals	 between	 the	
potential	cases	fall	within	the	estimated	infectious	period	of	LPAI	
virus-infected	 flocks	 and	 are	 therefore	 consistent	with	between-
farm	transmission.
Our	 study	 further	 suggests	 that	 both	 local	 and	 long-distance	
transmissions	 occurred	 and	 that	 between-farm	 transmission	 was	









easily	 through	 direct	 or	 indirect	 contact	 with	 wild	 birds	 (Koch	 &	
Elbers,	2006).
Potential	 local	 spread	within	 a	 poultry	 type	was	 observed	be-
tween	farms	infected	with	viruses	H1N5-2007-1	and	H1N5-2007-2,	
H6N1-2010-1	 and	 H6N1-2010-2	 and	 H10N9-2012-2	 and	
H10N9-2012-3.	 During	 these	 events,	 transmission	 may	 have	 oc-
curred	 via	 movement	 of	 persons	 or	 contaminated	 equipment	 be-
tween	neighbouring	farms,	which	 is	 likely	 to	occur	between	farms	
of	 the	 same	 poultry	 type	 because	 of	 a	 high	 probability	 of	 shared	
personnel,	 equipment	 and	 transport	 services	 (Leibler	 et	 al.,	 2010;	
McQuiston	 et	 al.,	 2005;	 Thomas	 et	 al.,	 2005;	 Vieira	 et	 al.,	 2009).	
This	 transmission	 route	 is	 supported	by	 the	 fact	 that	no	 influenza	
infections	were	detected	in	farms	holding	a	different	poultry	type	in	
potential	cases	H1N5-2007	and	H6N1-2010,	and	two	infected	farms	





transmission	 via	 human-mediated	 transport	was	 therefore	 consid-
ered	the	most	probable	route	of	transmission	for	potential	long-dis-
tance	 spread	within	a	poultry	 type,	which	was	observed	between	






(Jonges	et	 al.,	 2015;	 Spekreijse	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 These	 transmission	
routes	 may	 explain	 potential	 local	 spread	 between	 farms	 hold-
ing	different	poultry	types,	which	were	observed	between	farms	





However,	 detection	decreased	 rapidly	with	distance.	Hence,	 the	








sion	occurred	 in	 seven	of	 nine	 virologically	 analysed	 cases.	Based	
on	 these	 findings,	 transmission	 between	poultry	 farms	 likely	 con-
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